


Using Complexity Science in Analyzing Safety/Capacity of ATM Designs Tutorial, Part 2

Henk Blom



ICRAT 2014, May 26-29, Istanbul


Using Complexity Science in Analyzing Safety/Capacity of ATM Designs

- Motivation and background
- Complexity Science methods Part 1
- Complexity Science methods Part 2

Key Free Flight Research Question

- Free Flight (or Airborne Self Separation) has been “invented” as a potential solution for high traffic demand airspace
- ATM community research trend has been to direct Airborne Self Separation research to situations of less demanding airspace (where mid-air safety risk is coming from pairwise encounters only)
- Key research question: Up to which traffic demand can Free Flight be designed sufficiently safe ?

Safety/capacity analysis feedback to future ATM design




Tutorial Part 2

- Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF)
- Probabilistic Reachability Analysis
- Results for AMFF
- Advanced Airborne Self Separation (AASS)
- Results for AASS

Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF)

- **Future concept developed for traffic over Mediterranean area**
- **Aircrew gets freedom to select path and speed**
- **In return aircrew is responsible for self-separation**
- **Aircraft broadcast their states without delay to other aircraft**
- **Each a/c equipped with an Airborne Separation Assistance System**
- **In AMFF, conflicts are resolved one by one (pilot preference)**
 - Medium term: priority a/c does nothing
 - Short term: both aircraft resolve conflict




Evaluations performed for AMFF concept

- Real-time pilot-in-the-loop evaluations
- Eurocae/RTCA ED78a safety assessment

Development of Agent Based Model


- Defining the relevant Agents
- Hazard identification
- Developing Petri net for each Agent
- Connecting Agent Petri nets
- Generate Monte Carlo simulation model
- Parametrization, Verification & Calibration

Agents in AMFF




AMFF

Run #1




AMFF

Run #2



AMFF

Run #3




Tutorial Part 2

- Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF)
- Probabilistic Reachability Analysis
- Results for AMFF
- Advanced Airborne Self Separation (AASS)
- Results for AASS

Size of AMFF agent-based model

Agent	# of product places	Maximum colour Product state space
Aircraft	24^N	R^{13N}
Pilot-Flying (PF)	490^N	R^{28N}
Pilot-not-Flying (PNF)	7^N	R^{3N}
AGNC	$(15 \times 2^{16})^N$	R^{45N}
ASAS	48^N	$R^{37N+21N^2}$
Global CNS	16	R^0
PRODUCT	$\approx 16 \times (3.88 \times 10^{12})^N$	$R^{126N+21N^2}$

Model Power Hierarchy



[0]: [Ajmone Marsan et al, 1984]

[1]: [Malhotra & Trivedi, 1994], [Muppala et al, 2000]

[2]: [Davis, 1984]

[3]: [Everdij & Blom, 2005]


[4]: [Bujorianu & Lygeros, 2006]

[5]: [Everdij & Blom, 2006]

Bisimulation

- **Two systems are bisimulations when their executions are equivalent in probabilistic sense**
 - VanDerSchaft, 2004; Bujorianu et al., 2005
- **Systems with GSHP executions:**
 - SDCPN = Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri Net
 - GSHS = General Stochastic Hybrid System
 - HSDE = Hybrid Stochastic Differential Equation

SDCPN inherits analysis power of SDE's and formal verification power of automata



[4]: [Bujorianu & Lygeros, 2006]

[6]: [Everdij & Blom, 2010]

[5]: [Everdij & Blom, 2006]

[7]: [Everdij, 2010]

Approaches in Reach Probability Computation

- Markov Chain (MC) approximation (Prandini&Hu, 2006)
- Dynamic Programming (DP) approach (Abate, Amin, Prandini, Lygeros & Sastry, 2006)
- Interacting Particle System (IPS) approach (Cerou et al., 2005)

Interacting Particle System (IPS)

- Define a sequence of conflict levels decreasing in urgency (D_k 's)
 - Most urgent level represents collision ($D_m = D$)
- Simulate N_p particles; initially all outside D_1 (less urgent level)
- Freeze each particle that reaches the next urgent level before T
- Make N_p copies of frozen particles
- Repeat this until the most urgent level has been reached
- Count the simulated fraction $\tilde{\gamma}_k$ that reaches level k
- Estimated collision risk = $\tilde{\gamma}_1 \times \tilde{\gamma}_2 \times \tilde{\gamma}_3 \times \dots \times \tilde{\gamma}_m$

IPS convergence

Cerou, Del Moral, Legland and Lezaud (2002, 2005) have shown that the product of these fractions $\tilde{\gamma}_k$ forms an unbiased estimate of the probability of $\{s_t\}$ to hit the set D within the time period $[0, T)$, i.e.

$$\mathbb{E}[\prod_{k=1}^m \tilde{\gamma}_k] = \prod_{k=1}^m \gamma_k = P(\tau < T)$$

In addition there is a bound on the L^1 estimation error, i.e.:

$$\mathbb{E}(\prod_{k=1}^m \tilde{\gamma}_k - \prod_{k=1}^m \gamma_k) \leq \frac{c_p}{\sqrt{N_p}}$$

Hybrid IPS versions

1. Importance switching (Krystul&Blom, 2005)
 2. Rao-Blackwellization, using exact equations for $\{ \theta_t \}$ and particles for Euclidian state (Krystul&Blom, 2006)
- Both handle rare mode switching well
 - Large scale SHS scalability problem remains
 - Huge number of discrete product places

Hierarchical Hybrid IPS (HHIPS)

(Blom, Bakker & Krystul, 2007, 2009)

- ✓ Define an aggregated mode process $\{ \kappa_t \}$
with $\{ \mathcal{M}_k, \kappa \in \mathbb{K} \}$ a partition of \mathcal{M}

$$\kappa_t = \kappa \text{ if } \theta_t \in \mathcal{M}_k$$

- ✓ Apply Importance switching to $\{ \kappa_t \}$
- ✓ Rao-Blackwellization, i.e. use exact equations for $\{ \kappa_t \}$
and particles for the other process elements $\{ x_t, \theta_t \}$

Tutorial Part 2

- Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF)
- Probabilistic Reachability Analysis
- Results for AMFF
- Advanced Airborne Self Separation (AASS)
- Results for AASS

Scenarios

- Two aircraft encounter
- Eight aircraft encounter
- Random traffic

Sequence of conflict levels for air traffic

k	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
D_k (Nm)	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	2.5	1.25	0.5	0.054
h_k (ft)	900	900	900	900	900	500	250	131
Δ_k (min)	8	2.5	1.5	0	0	0	0	0

Medium Term
Conflict (MTC)


Short Term
Conflict (STC)

Minimum
Separation
Infringement
(MSI)


Near Mid-Air
Collision
(NMAC)

Mid-Air Collision
(MAC)


Two-aircraft encounter and dependable technical systems




Two-aircraft vs. eight-aircraft encounter



Eight-aircraft encounter: Baseline PF response vs. Fast PF response




Random traffic, high density



- **Eight aircraft per packed container**
 - 3 times as dense above Frankfurt on 23rd July '99

Random high traffic: Uncontrolled vs. AMFF controlled



Tutorial Part 2

- Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF)
- Probabilistic Reachability Analysis
- Results for AMFF
- Advanced Airborne Self Separation (AASS)
- Results for AASS



Advanced Airborne Self Separation ConOps considered



- Aircraft plan conflict-free 4D trajectories
 - Reference Business Trajectory (RBT)
- Each a/c broadcasts its current RBT and its destination to other aircraft
- SWIM transfers this over-the-horizon.
- Conflict detection and resolution take all aircraft into account
 - Medium Term (5-15 mins)
 - Short Term (3-5 mins)
- Tactical Separation Minima is down from 5Nm to 3 Nm
 - Stemming from RESET project





NASA research on Advanced Airborne Self Separation ConOps



- **Basic concept has been developed by NASA [NASA, 2004]**
 - This includes ConOps extension for non-equipped aircraft
 - Has recently been published [Wing and Cotton, ATIO-2011]
- **Extensive study of planning layer**
 - Under nominal conditions [Consiglio et al., ATIO-2007]
 - Effect of pilot response delays [Consiglio et al., ATIO-2008, ICAS-2010]
 - Effect of large wind deviations [Consiglio et al., ATM-2009]
 - Planning layer absorbs all but large wind deviations (60 kts)
- **Follow-up Research Question:**
 - Can the tactical layer resolve this safely?





Medium Term CD&R approach




- Each aircraft detects conflicts (5NM/1000ft) 10 min. ahead
- a/c nearest to destination has priority over other a/c.
- a/c with lowest priority has to make its 4D plan conflict free (15 min ahead) with all other plans.
- Undershooting of 5Nm/1000ft is allowed if there is no feasible conflict free plan and it does not create a short term conflict.
- Then such aircraft broadcasts its non-conflict-free 4D plan together with a message of being “Handicapped” (which is priority increasing)






Velocity Obstacles (Collision Cones) Medium Term (10 min & 5 Nm)






Velocity Obstacles (Collision Cones) Medium Term (10 min & 5 Nm)





Velocity Obstacles (Collision Cones) Medium Term (10 min & 5 Nm)





Short Term CD&R approach




- a/c which detects conflict is obliged to resolve the conflict without awaiting any of the other aircraft
- Course change is identified using Velocity Obstacles (3 min. ahead)
- Conflict free means 3Nm/900ft minimal predicted miss distance
- Undershooting of these values is allowed if there is no feasible alternative
- a/c broadcasts its new course or rate of climb/descend




Velocity Obstacles = Collision Cones

Short Term (3 min & 3 Nm)




Agents in Airborne Self Separation






Run #1






Run #2





Run #3



Tutorial Part 2

- Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF)
- Probabilistic Reachability Analysis
- Results for AMFF
- Advanced Airborne Self Separation (AASS)
- Results for AASS




Traffic Scenarios


- Two aircraft encounter
- Eight aircraft encounter
- Random traffic high density




2 a/c, varying ASAS dependability




8 a/c versus 2 a/c




8 a/c, varying ASAS dependability



8 a/c, STCR separation back to 5 Nm




Random Traffic Scenarios




- Periodic Boundary Condition
- Eight a/c per packed box/ no climbing or descending a/c
- Vary container size in order to simulate:
 - 3x as dense as high density area in 2005
 - 6x as dense as high density area in 2005

Random traffic: 3x and 6x 2005




Tactical Separation: 5Nm and 3Nm






3x high 2005 random traffic





3x high 2005 traffic + wind error 10/ 20/ 30 m/s



- MFF project showed: Pilots like it, if they know that ASAS supporting systems are dependable
- Dependability requirements have been identified using RTCA DO-264 (=EurocaeED78a) and rare event MC simulations
- Agent Based Modelling & Simulation shows: It can safely accommodate very high en route traffic demands at current separation minima
- To safely accommodate 3x traffic of 2005, Tactical Separation distance can stay at 5 Nm
- Other aspects have been addressed in complementary studies
 - CD&R algorithms more advanced than Velocity Obstacles
 - Cost Benefit

Using Complexity Science in Analyzing Safety/Capacity of ATM Designs

- Motivation and background
- Complexity Science methods Part 1
- Complexity Science methods Part 2

Questions / Discussion



Validation of assessed risk level

- **Simulation model \neq Reality**
- **Identify the differences**
- **Assess each difference individually (and conditionally)**
 - use of statistical data and expert knowledge
- **Assess model parameter sensitivities by Monte Carlo simulations**
- **Evaluate effect of each assumption at simulated risk level**
 - use of statistical data and expert knowledge
- **Evaluate combined effects of all model assumptions**
 - Typical output: expected risk and 95% area
- **Improve simulation model for large differences**